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INTRODUCTION
This Note characterizes and evaluates the current status of the pre-
cautionary principle in international law and suggests how it could be
more effectively incorporated into bodies of law such as trade law. Much
of the literature focuses on whether the principle is a legal rule. This
Note shows that precaution need not necessarily fit into the traditional
categories of international legal sources' but may derive its legal force
from being interpreted as a standard. While the theme-and thesis-of
this Note will strike some as provocative, it will appear as an under-
statement to others, thereby reflecting the ongoing controversy about the
role and status of the precautionary principle in international law.
Having its origin with the rise of environmentalism in Germany in the
1970s,2 the precautionary principle was exported to the United States in
the 1980s before it became an element of the European Community's en-
vironmental policy in the 1990s.3 At the same time, the principle was
incorporated into numerous international conventions and declarations, not
limited to environmental law.4 Despite this thirty year history, defining the
precautionary principle remains problematic (as will be further discussed),
with the Rio Declaration providing the most commonly stated definition:
"In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation."5 As this definition indicates, although
significant scientific advances have been made, science is, as yet, incapa-
1. As described in the STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38(1)
[hereinafter ICJ STATUTE].
2. Frangois Ewald finds the philosophical origin of the principle in HANS JONAS, THE
IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY (1984), which became a landmark of contemporary ecological
awareness. The thesis is that men now have the capacity to produce effects on the environment
that cannot be anticipated with certainty. Having no master other than himself, mankind there-
fore has the responsibility to manage this infinite capacity. According to Ewald, there is a need
to assign responsibility today for potential damages in a distant future. Precaution introduces a
shift from a logic of compensation (for an actual or a past damage) to a decisionmaking
framework that would avoid the occurrence of irreversible damages. Franqois Ewald, The
Return of the Crafty Genius: An Outline of a Philosophy of Precaution, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 47,
70-77 (1999).
3. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREA-
TIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2,
1997, art. 174, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter E.C. TREATY] (formerly article 130 R in the
Treaty on European Union).
4. See Gregory D. Fullem, Note, The Precautionary Principle: Environmental Protec-
tion in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 495 (1995) (providing a
more extensive historical background).
5. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15, June 13, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 874, 879 [hereinafter Rio Declaration] (emphasis added).
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ble of addressing ever-growing global threats to human health and the
environment. The precautionary principle is intended to take into ac-
count these limits of science in addressing grave or irreversible risks.
More importantly, however, it addresses the temptation for decision
makers to rely on scientific expertise in order to avoid taking responsibil-
ity for their policies, requiring experts to recognize the imperfection of
their science and placing the burden on policymakers to decide what
level of risk is acceptable.
The precautionary principle applies when (1) a situation (use of a
substance, or behavior, for example) exists, (2) which may threaten the
environment or human health in a grave or irreversible way, and (3) there
is a serious risk that the threat will materialize. Implicit in this setting is
the scientific uncertainty about the nature and extent of the threat, or un-
certainty as to the realization of the risk into a major harm. The issue is
to determine the legal implications of the principle. What level of risk
should trigger the implementation of the principle? Which costs should
be offset, as against the environmental damage? Is the principle a proce-
dural obligation, or does it carry an obligation to attain a certain result in
terms of environmental protection? At first sight, it seems that no two
formulations of the principle have the same perspective. Notwithstanding
these various trends, the most recent jurisprudence indicates a move to-
ward the recognition of the principle as a procedural standard. This will
be examined further in Part II.
Science can be thought of as relatively uniform, whereas the political
6legitimacy of a certain risk level is contingent upon the societal context.
6. Sheila Jasanoff has carried out comparative studies of risk management in Europe
and the United States, as well as in certain international organizations such as the International
Agency for Research on Cancer (I.A.R.C.). She identifies three categories of states in relation
to identification processes of carcinogenic substances. SHEILA JASANOFF, RISK MANAGEMENT
AND POLITICAL CULTURE 80 (1986). A first group, including Germany and the I.A.R.C., dele-
gates most of the decisionmaking to experts, even in the case of scientific uncertainty. The
scientists are called upon to propose solutions that the political leaders endorse, relying on the
expertise available. A second group, including Canada and the United Kingdom, has a more
cooperative approach, where the state administration and the experts determine the classifica-
tion of potentially harmful products. The uncertainties are usually left out of the public debate.
The United States is an example of the third model, where political decisionmakers make the
ultimate call in the face of scientific uncertainties, after consulting with the administrative
agencies. The public debate has a more important role, and tends to focus more on the scien-
tific questions at stake, sometimes making it more difficult to take a quick action. In a
subsequent article, Jasanoff focuses on technological risk. She stresses the American approach
as open, public, confrontational, and costly, as opposed to a more secret, consensual, and cost-
conscious European attitude. The United States favors a quantitative analysis of risk and seeks
a "no need for action" risk level, whereas the Europeans prefer qualitative evaluations of the
risks and of the harmfulness of a substance. Jasanoff notes that these diverging perspectives on
political decisionmaking and risk management do not necessarily translate into different poli-
cies in the end, but the processes are fundamentally dissimilar. Sheila Jasanoff, American
Exceptionalism and the Political Acknowledgement of Risk, 119 DAEDALUS 61, 63-78 (1990).
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Science can estimate a risk level within a certain range of error but can-
not tell us what level of risk is socially acceptable. The danger is to
invoke the precautionary principle as a ready-made justification when
scientific evidence is not conclusive, and decision makers want to make
a decision without carefully weighing the interests at stake. The oppo-
nents of the precautionary principle often warn about the pitfalls of the
principle, such as the chilling effect it might have on the development of
new-and therefore possibly risky-technology, or the abusive use of
the principle by States wanting to block imports from other States. These
dangers are real and call for a close delineation of the principle.
Traditional divisions of public international law sources are custom
and treaties. More recently, soft law emerged as a sui generis phenome-
non, not carrying binding obligations, but providing an indicator of the
law-in-making that has a stronger value than mere political declarations
or diplomatic negotiations. This Note examines the precautionary princi-
ple simply as a standard; yet another nontraditional category of
international law. Joel Trachtman characterizes a standard as the means
to establish "general guidance to both the person governed and the per-
son charged with applying the law, but does not, in advance, specify in
precise detail the conduct required or proscribed."7 Standards are used
extensively in the domestic law of the United States (references to the
"reasonable person" in contracts law is an example) and the growing
diversity of norms and actors in the international era may well call for
the use of such standards. It is in this sense that the term "standard" will
be used here.
Part I of this Note examines the different formulations of the precau-
tionary principle and its relation with other norms of environmental law,
showing how the principle can be viewed as a standard of international
law. Part II focuses on the doctrinal debate about the legal value of the
principle. The different schools of thought suggest three trends: some
deny any legal value to the principle, others view it as an established
principle of customary law, while an intermediate position considers it as
a legal norm despite its equivocal definition. Part III analyzes how the
principle has been applied by such international jurisdictions and organi-
zations as the European Community and the World Trade Organization.
The role of the precautionary principle in international courts and other
regulatory instances may serve as a test to ascertain its legal significance.
7. Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333,
334 (1999).
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I. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL TEXTS
This Part investigates the numerous formulations of the precautionary
principle. It shows that the principle is called upon in relation to many en-
vironmental issues, ranging from general environmental protection to
fisheries, genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and hazardous waste.
In other words, the principle is invoked with respect to human-generated
activities as well as the preservation of natural resources. Another recur-
rent element is that the precautionary principle rarely stands alone, but
rather it is articulated with other norms or processes. It is precisely this
conglomerate of regulatory elements that makes the precautionary princi-
ple an international standard. Section L.A analyzes the different
formulations of the principle and Section I.B studies the incorporation of
other norms into the principle.
A. A Formulation Yet Unsettled
Regulations on common environmental goods such as living and
mineral natural resources, the atmosphere, and water often refer to the
precautionary principle. The early manifestations of the principle date
back to the early 1980s and found a new expression in the 1990s with
the enactment of domestic legislation seeking to protect the environment,
which relied on the precautionary principle.
The 1982 World Charter for Nature, a United Nations resolution
proposing a general agenda for environmental protection, stated that "ac-
tivities which are likely to pose a significant risk to nature shall be
preceded by an exhaustive examination; their proponents shall demon-
strate that expected benefits outweigh potential damages to nature, and
where potential adverse effects are not fully understood, the activities
shall not proceed." 8 This formulation contains typical precautionary ele-
ments. First, the provision seeks to reverse the burden of proof as to the
deleterious effects of the activity: it is up to its proponent to prove that
the activity is harmless. Second, it bans any potentially harmful activity
if scientific uncertainty is such that it does not allow for a complete im-
pact assessment ex ante.
Unfortunately, the World Charter for Nature provision is not worka-
ble as such. It fails to specify what is included in the evaluation of the
activity and of its impact on the environment and does not establish the
level of scientific uncertainty that should trigger precautionary measures.
The first part of the provision (activities authorized if their benefits out-
weigh the potential damages) provides no indication of the acceptable
8. G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/37/L.4
and Add. I (1982) [hereinafter World Charter for Nature].
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level of risk. In such a situation, intergenerational interests could be ad-
versely affected if the tradeoff between benefits and potential damages is
calculated in the short or medium term. The promoter of an activity will
typically plan for a relatively quick return on investment and will not be
inclined to balance these short-term profits against interests of future
generations in a sound environment.9
The Rio Declaration has already been mentioned as the most often
cited formulation of the precautionary principle. It is more specific than
the World Charter for Nature provision since it links the implementation
of the principle to the risk of a "grave or irreversible damage to the envi-
ronment." This baseline for intervention has rapidly become a landmark
of the precautionary principle.' ° The Declaration further defines precau-
tionary measures" as prevention in the face of scientific uncertainty.
However, the content and extent of the actions to be taken remain ob-
scure; at best, it can be thought that the promotion and implementation
of the measures are within the sole competency of the Member States.
This may prove inadequate in the case of global threats to the environ-
ment such as global warming or transboundary pollution. In any case,
the Declaration is soft law, thus not imposing any binding obligation
upon the signatory States.
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES)'2 and the Biodiversity Convention 3 call for an implementation
9. Id.
10. The Association of South East Asian Nations Agreement on the Conservation of Na-
ture and Natural Resources already provides that members should prevent changes to local
ecosystems that would not be reversible within a reasonable period of time. Agreement on the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources an. 4(1)(d), Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN)(July 9, 1985), at http://www.aseansec.org/menu.asp?action=5&content=2
(last visited Mar. 12, 2002).
11. A wide terminology is used in reference to the precautionary principle. A nonexhaus-
tive list would include precautionary "approach," "methodology" "action," "measures," and
"principle." The intense debate on the precautionary "principle" and the various meanings that
underlie the term is certainly one explanation for this multiple wording of the concept. The
term "precautionary approach" can be understood as a response to another environmental law
concept: the preventive approach. The latter represents the traditional view of environmental
protection, as opposed to the emerging precautionary approach. The legal core of such an
"approach" is weak; the idea is rather to set a general orientation in order to guide further
action. The precautionary approach is more of a conceptual framework than a legal instru-
ment. In contrast, the "principle" carries stronger legal implications. The choice of the word
"measure" in the Declaration reflects the rejection by the negotiators of the European proposal
to endorse a more fleshed out "principle." Rio Declaration, supra note 5.
12. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 12 I.L.M. 1085 [hereinafter CITES Convention].
13. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, pmbl., S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-
20 (1993), 31 I.L.M. 818 (stating in its preamble that "where there is a threat of significant
reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a
reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such threat").
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of the precautionary principle in a way similar to the Rio Declaration.
The 1994 Conference of Member States of the CITES set out a twofold
mechanism to protect species at risk: first, in a clear deference to the
precautionary principle, species that may be at risk but where scientific
uncertainty remains, qualify for a classification in Annex I and II; sec-
ond, uncertainty may not be invoked to justify failure to take protective
measures.
Climate change is one of the paramount examples of the develop-
ment of the precautionary principle. The debate as to global warming
rages among the scientific community, giving no firm ground for poli-
cymakers. Yet the most agreed-upon element is that we do not know how
to reverse, or even to stop the process. Since the Vienna Convention on
the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985," states have called for a pre-
cautionary principle approach when regulating greenhouse gases" or
specific substances such as CFCs. The Agenda 21, in Chapter 35.3 adds
to the now traditional elements of grave or irreversible damage and sci-
entific uncertainty a novel provision: measures taken under the
precautionary approach should be "actions which are justified in their
own right."'6 This interesting distinction means that the measures should
have a technical or scientific base, and not be solely a political decision.
Protection of the marine environment is the oldest theme for precau-
tion. 7 In 1969, the International Convention Relating to Intervention on
the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties required that action be
taken when the coasts are endangered, considering, inter alia, "the extent
and probability of imminent damage if those measures are not taken."' 8
14. Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, pmbl.,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,097, at 2, 1513 U.N.T.S. (volume not yet printed).
15. Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S.
3 (amended June 29, 1990)(specifying that Member States should take precautionary meas-
ures to control emissions of substances degrading the ozone layer). The Convention on
Climate reiterates the provisions of the Ministerial Declaration of the Second Climate Change
Conference (November 7, 1990), section 7: "where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent such environmental degradation." Framework Convention on
Climate Change, May 9, 1992, art. 3.3, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. Section 8 of the Ministerial Decla-
ration of the Second Climate Change Conference stresses the issue of small insular states,
whose existence is threatened by a possible elevation of the sea level. Ministerial Declaration
of the Second World Climate Conference, reproduced in G.A. Res. 45/696, U.N. GAOR, 45th
Sess., Agenda Item 81, at 18, U.N. Doc. A/45/696/Add. I (1990).
16. Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, United Nations Con-
ference on Environment and Development (UNCED), ch. 35.3, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.151/PC/100/Add. 1, U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.1 1 (June 14, 1992).
17. Philippe Sands, The 'Greening'of International Law: Emerging Principles and Rules,
1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 293, 298 (1994).
18. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969, art. V (3) (a), 26 U.S.T. 765, 970 U.N.T.S. 211, 212.
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This is somewhat different from later formulations of the precautionary
principle, such as that is included in the Ministerial Declaration for the
Protection of the North Sea.' 9 Under article XVI (1) "The Principle of
Precautionary Action," the members are committed to protect the North
Sea ecosystem by reducing marine pollution even if no scientific evi-
dence establishes a causal link between the emissions and the adverse
effects on the marine environment. Adhesion to the precautionary princi-
ple was reinforced during the Third Conference in 1990. Similarly, the
OSPAR Convention," the Baltic Sea Convention,"' and the Convention
on the Transboundary Effects of Accidental Industrial Pollution" men-
tion the principle.
The regulation of international fisheries is the area where the precau-
tionary principle currently finds its most complete application. The issue
is raised by the discovery of new fisheries, as the quantity of newly
found stocks and their rate of reproduction cannot be ascertained imme-
diately. Yet, if these stocks are fished too extensively before the
sustainable level of exploitation is determined, the stocks are at risk of
being permanently decimated. In a precautionary setting, the stocks are
either not fished at all until the necessary parameters are established, or
exploited at a rate low enough to ensure the preservation of the stock.
Once the stocks have been scientifically evaluated, safe quotas can be
established that will guarantee the viability of the resource. The Montego
Bay Convention23 implicitly introduced the notion of precaution, and the
application agreement of the Straddling Fish Convention explicitly en-
dorses the precautionary approach.24 Here, the principle is incorporated
in a binding agreement and the International Tribunal on the Law of the
Sea (ITLOS) has given it legal value in a recent case involving Australia,
New Zealand, and Japan.25
International agreements on the disposal of hazardous waste offer
mixed evidence on the recognition of the precautionary principle. The
19. Second Conference on the Protection of the North Sea: Ministerial Declaration Call-
ing for Reduction of Pollution, Nov. 25, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 835, 840 [hereinafter North Sea
Conference].
20. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic,
Sept. 22, 1992, art. 2.2 (a), 32 I.L.M. 1069 [hereinafter OSPAR Convention]. This convention
reverses the burden of proof for immersion of radioactive waste.
21. Council Decision 94/157/EC of 9 April 1992, Helsinki Convention for the Protection
of the Marine Environment in the Baltic Sea Area, art. 3.2, 1994 O.J. (L 73) 20.
22. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and Interna-
tional Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, art. 2.5 (a), Doc. ENVWA/R. 53 and Add. 1, 31 I.L.M. 1312.
23. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3.
24. U.N. Conference on the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995, art. 6, 34 I.L.M. 1542.
25. See infra Part Ill.
[Vol. 23:429
The Precautionary Principle
Basle Convention on Hazardous Waste26 does not mention the principle
and has never been interpreted to endorse it, even implicitly. By contrast,
the Bamako Convention 27 poses the principle both as a general obligation
and as a specific framework for certain provisions. Article 4(3)(f) invites
members to take precautionary measures without waiting for scientific
qualification of the risk for human health and the environment and lists a
number of actions that would be incompatible with a precautionary
framework. Examples of incompatibility include the dumping of toxic
waste in the sea or in rivers. This provision, like the ones on marine pol-
lution, represents a fundamental shift from the traditional policies based
on the absorption capacity of specific ecosystems.
Finally, with the recent Cartagena Protocol,28 GMOs have triggered
the latest debate on the application of the precautionary principle. 9 Al-
though the Cartagena Protocol endorses the principle in multiple
provisions, it still fails to ascertain the full meaning and the implications
of the principle. The struggle surrounding precaution is manifest in the
way it is incorporated into the agreement. 30
26. Council Decision 93/98 of 22 March 1983, Basle Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 1993 O.J. (L 39) 3.
27. Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Imports Into Africa and the Control of Trans-
boundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Waste Within Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, 31
I.L.M. 163.
28. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29,
2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 [hereinafter Cartagena Protocol].
29. Kim Brooks, History, Change and Policy: Factors Leading to the Current Opposition
to Food Biotechnology, 5 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 153, 153-54 (2000). The author stresses the
diverging trends of United States and European GMOs regulations. In 1992, the FDA declined
to differentiate GMOs from traditional crops, therefore sending the message that engineered
food presents no specificity in terms of environment and health impact. By fall 1999, pressure
groups obtained a moratorium on the growth of modified crops in Europe. This measure se-
verely hampered the United States shipments of corn and soybeans, since the latter contained
both engineered and traditional crops, without distinction. Consumer concern over GMOs then
spread to Australia, Japan, Brazil, and ultimately back to the United States, where FDA regu-
lations are now questioned. This struggle is well reflected by the debate surrounding the
Cartagena Protocol.
30. See Molly Saigo, Agricultural Biotechnology and the Negotiation of the Biosafety
Protocol, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 779, 811 (2000) (discussing the negotiation of the
Cartagena Protocol). The United States is not a member of the Cartagena Protocol and it ex-
pressed opposition to the main provisions of the agreement during the negotiation, but then-
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared an intention to abide by Protocol terms. The
Miami Group (including Argentina, Australia, the United States, supported by the massive
presence of biotech industries, Canada, Chile, and Paraguay) advocated a narrow Protocol and
regulations limited to products that were scientifically demonstrated to have a potential ad-
verse effect on biodiversity. At the other end of the spectrum, the "Like Minded Countries"
(China, most members of the G77, and most of the European Communities) pushed for a
strong Protocol including the precautionary principle and a liability and compensation mecha-
nism for damages caused by GMOs. The Compromise Group (Switzerland, Japan, Korea, and
Norway) lobbied for a middle ground.
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According to the Protocol, states can prohibit the importation of ge-
netically engineered foods on the basis of precaution. The Cartagena
Protocol creates strict procedures to regulate GMOs in international
trade, thus giving a content and framework for the principle. The pream-
ble refers to Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration and articles 10.6 and
11.8 reiterate the principle3 . In fact, it is article 15 on risk assessment,
that indicates the real role of the principle in the Protocol. Article 15 im-
plements a framework where it is up to the export candidate to provide
information on the products, and if required, to proceed to the risk
evaluation. In other words, the burden of proof as to the safety of the
product rests upon the exporter; implicitly, GMOs are considered prima
facie as unsafe products. Article 8.2 ambiguously addresses the issue of
legal responsibility if the exporter misrepresents information about his
products, it is suggested that the state of origin of the exports bears an
obligation to offer a remedy in case of such a fraud.32 Although it is
somewhat awkward, this provision is a first attempt to link a precaution-
ary regime to state responsibility.
At the same time, the Protocol seeks to put clear limits on the appli-
cation of the principle. Annex III, section 3 specifies that the existence,
absence, or gravity of a risk should not be implied solely because of sci-
entific uncertainty.33 Therefore, the Protocol states both that scientific
uncertainties should not be used as a reason to postpone action but that
they are also not a reason to take action. As a result, the only clear re-
quirements are the risk evaluation procedures. The Member States
remain free to take whatever stand they wish on the GMOs exports, so
31. Cartagena Protocol, supra note 28. Article 10.6 states:
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and
knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified
organism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party
of import, taking also into account risks to human health, shall not prevent that
Party from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of the living
modified organism in question as referred to in paragraph 3 above, in order to avoid
or minimize such potential adverse effects.
Id. art. 10.7
Article 11.8 states:
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and
knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified
organism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party
of import, taking also into account risks to human health, shall not prevent that
Party from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of that living
modified organism intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing, in or-
der to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.
Id. art. 11.8
32. Cartagena Protocol, supra note 28, at 1030.
33. Id. at 1045.
[Vol. 23:429
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long as the policies are consistent with the results of the evaluation. The
effect is to substantially weaken the impact that the principle could have
on the agreement. Adler still voices the traditional complaint that insert-
ing the principle in the Protocol is only an excuse to delay the diffusion
of new technology.34 It seems that the Protocol bears a much more re-
strictive interpretation of the principle than that feared by Adler. The
foremost feature is the reversal of the burden of proof, which essentially
leaves it to those who are the best informed to prove the harmlessness of
their products.
This brief overview already suggests some of the substantive issues
raised by the precautionary principle. The next Part examines the com-
ponents of the principle and shows that they form an ensemble much like
a standard.
B. The Articulation of the Precautionary Principle
with Other Environmental Norms
In the international legal references presented above, citation to the
precautionary principle is almost always accompanied by references to
other norms. Indeed, the exponential development of environmental law
over the last decade resulted in the promotion of related concepts that are
progressively taking a legal form. Concerns about intergenerational eq-
uity and sustainable development are examples of recent trends, and they
are closely articulated with the notion of precaution.
The principle proves a useful tool from a sustainable development
perspective. Because it seeks to prevent irreversible harm to the envi-
ronment, it poses limits to the use of unsafe new technology, as well as
the spread of older technologies that have proven harmful. Principle 15
of the Rio Declaration shows awareness of the particular situation of de-
veloping countries when it links the precautionary principle to capacity
building. Similarly, the Montreal Protocol introduces precautionary
measures to "control equitably total global emissions of substances that
deplete it."35 These limits are intrinsic elements of a workable precau-
tionary principle.
Intergenerational equity raises the issue of the temporal allocation of
environmental resources. Setting aside the moral motive, the basic eco-
nomic insight is that goods should be preserved today that will have an
equal or higher value later, or the lack of which will be very costly. This
concern does not appear in the basic formulation of the precautionary
34. Jonathan H. Adler, The Cartagena Protocol and Biological Diversity: Biosafe or Bio-
sorry?, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 761, 776-77 (2000).
35. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1541, 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) (emphasis added).
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principle as stated in the Rio Declaration.36 However, if the principle is to
be an efficient tool of environmental law, it requires some cost effective-
ness limitation. This criterion will be further studied below but it is
useful to allude to it here to develop the link between the precaution and
intergenerational equity. The cost-effective precautionary policy enables
incorporation of future costs induced by a failure to prevent the damage
today. The principle could therefore give a value to the future environ-
ment, so that grave or irreversible impairment of this future resource has
a cost now. Prevention of a potential future harm would be evaluated not
only in terms of its impact on the environment or health, but also in
terms of the economic cost over time of a failure to take action.
Many formulations of the principle also call for the continuation of
scientific research, to remove the remaining uncertainties and thus re-
evaluate the policies taken in the context of uncertainty. By worrying
today about the later effects of a substance, coming generations are given
a chance to reassess the regulations with better tools in their hands. The
Cartagena Protocol explicitly provides that an importation decision may
be re-evaluated at any time, should further information be available.37 In
the Beef Hormones case before the World Trade Organization (WTO),38
the European Community (EC) committed itself to continuing research
on the possible carcinogenic effects of the growth hormones on human
health.
Finally, the Rio Declaration formulated the Participation Principle
(Principle 10) to promote public information and consultation. The pre-
cautionary principle may be fed by this norm since the choice of an
acceptable level of risk requires a social debate. This public debate may
be stimulated pursuant to the participation principle. Again, the Cart-
agena Protocol offers the best example of this linkage. At the core of the
Protocol is the exchange of data between the potential exporter and the
authorities that will allow or refuse the product. Even though the receiv-
ing party has a duty to protect the confidentiality of this information, this
36. Rio Declaration, supra note 5.
37. Cartagena Protocol, supra note 28, art. 12.2:
A Party of export or a notifier may request the Party of import to review a decision
it has made in respect of it under Article 10 where the Party of export or the notifier
considers that: (a) A change in circumstances has occurred that may influence the
outcome of the risk assessment upon which the decision was based; or (b) Addi-
tional relevant scientific or technical information has become available.
Id.
38. Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Prod-
ucts, WT/DS26/RIUSA and WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997), http://www.wto.org
[hereinafter Hormones Panel report]; Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan.
16, 1998), http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Appellate Body Hormones report].
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only goes so far as the domestic standard. In other words, the informa-
tion will be protected on a national treatment basis, which means that if a
State's legislature authorizes the release of certain data, the foreign ex-
porter will be treated according to that legislation as well.39 Article 23 on
public participation and the access to the Exchange Center for Techno-
logical Risk are additional elements in this perspective. '
This first appreciation of the precautionary principle leads to the
conclusion that it has a formal as well as a substantive existence, al-
though numerous aspects remain undefined. The principle does not Stand
alone as a political pretense but is indeed interwoven with other interna-
tional law norms. Because of the nature of this network of norms, the
precautionary principle appears as a process more than a bright line rule,
as a matrix rather than as a solution. The next Part attempts to give a le-
gal qualification to this still evolving norm.
II. THE DOCTRINAL DEBATE: WHAT LEGAL STATUS FOR THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE?
Parallel to the debate on the content of the principle is a debate on its
legal value. This Part stresses that the normativity of the principle is not
necessarily exhausted by its legality. If the current development of the
principle may not allow it to belong to the traditional sources of interna-
tional law, its role may be derived from other normative categories. Part
of the doctrine sees the principle as a political guideline while a growing
number of analyses construe precaution as a standard.
A. The Principle as Traditional International Law?
Treaties, custom, and jus cogens are usually considered the only
sources of international law. The precautionary principle, as seen above,
is included in numerous treaties, and certain authors have argued that the
principle is emerging as a customary rule. If such were the case, States
would be bound by this customary obligation, and violating it would
trigger their responsibility at the international level. Considering the un-
certainties surrounding the exact content of a precautionary obligation, it
seems difficult to determine exactly what responsibilities and what
remedies would be appropriate. Indeed, at this time, responsibility issues
in relation to the precautionary principle remain largely unresolved. As
tojus cogens, it is a category restricted to very few norms recognized as
39. See Cartagena Protocol, supra note 28, art. 21 (on confidentiality), art. 21.3 (which
introduces a clause similar to a national treatment obligation).
40. Id. at 1038.
Winter 20021
Michigan Journal of International Law
fundamentals of society; precaution is certainly nowhere near such
status.
1. A Treaty Rule? Customary Law?
Despite its presence in several treaties, the precautionary principle is
often not interpreted as a binding rule. As it has been shown, imprecise
formulations account for this exclusion. In such circumstances, article
31 (3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is powerless to
translate the provision into an obligation.4 ' An exception to this general
trend appears in article XVI (21)(b) and (22)(a) of the Ministerial Decla-
ration for the Protection of the North Sea,42 which reverses the burden of
proof for dumping of waste at sea.
Few authors advocate the formation of a custom of precaution. Cam-
eron and Abouchar establish a parallel between the emergence of the
principle as customary law and the formation of "instant custom" in the
law of space sovereignty. 3 The authors highlight the number of States
recognizing the principle, based on the signatories of the Bergen Decla-
ration (34 States). To them, this indicates the fulfillment of the
conditions set forth in article 38 of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) Statute." Several critiques can be made. First, the authors seem to
consider State practice as a manifestation of the opinio juris, whereas
both elements are separate and complementary. Second, the mere num-
ber of signatories of an international agreement appears insufficient to
indicate the formation of a custom, or its exact content and the obliga-
tions it carries. A safer hypothesis is that such elements may only
indicate the genesis of the customary process. Hohmann and Sands also
defend the principle as a customary norm.45
If the principle is to be considered as a binding legal obligation,
whether it is of customary origin or not, it entails first that it has a con-
tent specific enough to prescribe a particular behavior, and second, that
41. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(3)(c), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340.
42. North Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 842.
43. James Cameron & Julie Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental
Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of Global Environment, 14 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1991). "Instant custom" was a term coined to describe the process of accep-
tance of the twelve nautical miles limit for the territorial sea as a binding rule while the
Montego Bay Convention was negotiated and before the norm was formally integrated into the
instrument.
44. ICJ STATUTE art. 38.
45. HAROLD HOHMANN, PRECAUTIONARY LEGAL DUTIES AND PRINCIPLES OF MODERN
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 342-44 (1994); Philippe Sands, L'affaire des essais
nucldaires II (Nouvelle-ZWlande c. France): contribution de l'instance du droit international
de l'environnement, 1997 REVUE G9N9RALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [R.G.D.I.P.]
447,473.
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State responsibility can be invoked for violation of the norm. The follow-
ing Section will examine the precautionary principle alternatively as a
procedural obligation and as an obligation of result. It will then identify
some of the responsibility issues.
2. A Procedural Obligation; an Obligation of Result
The Cartagena Protocol is the closest expression of a procedural ver-
sion of the principle. 6 It prescribes a risk evaluation and defines the
boundaries of the obligation. As we have seen, the spirit of such obliga-
tions is precautionary. However, the States remain free to implement
precaution, or not, depending on the results yielded by the evaluation.
Reversing of the burden of proof is another procedural application of the
principle. Nonetheless, it seems that these procedures fail to fully mate-
rialize the concept of precaution and might miss the essential target:
preventing potentially irreversible damage.
In this perspective, a substantive obligation would be more appropri-
ate. The issue is then to specify the goal to be achieved. Is it the effective
prevention of a hypothetical danger, which might not be at all possible;
is it ensuring that the risk remains at an acceptable level; 47 is it imple-
menting all possible means to avoid the damage? The possibilities are
many. Another question is the evaluation of the result, knowing that the
danger might not occur at all, regardless of the measures implemented
or, conversely, that the available resources may be powerless to avoid the
damage. In the latter case, the obligation would be breached without
fault of the breaching party. This offers a transition to the issue of re-
sponsibility.
46. Cartagena Protocol, supra note 28.
47. On the difficulty to agree on an acceptable level of risk, see the example of the afla-
toxins in Jean-Pierre Doussin & Philippe Verger, Le r6le de l'analyse des risques dans le
processus d'ilaboration des r~glementations concernant les aliments, REVUE DE LA CONCUR-
RENCE ET DE LA COMMUNAUTt, No. 112 (1998), at 34-35. The aflatoxins are a notoriously
carcinogenic contaminant present in mold, cereals, and nuts. States agreed to reduce the risk
for human health generated by this substance to the lowest possible level but are unable to
agree on a uniform international standard, which would define good agricultural practices. The
European countries advocate very strict standards, which is consistent with the agricultural
conditions in the region (deterioration of the cereals is contingent on the climate and Europe
offers a more favorable environment to prevent the toxin from developing). The United States
proposes a less stringent standard corresponding to their climatic conditions. Europe must now
demonstrate the benefit for consumers of a lower level of risk. The difference would be two
additional cases of cancer per million individuals with the United States standard, compared to
one case per million individuals with the stricter standard. The Europeans argue that any risk
higher than one case per million is unacceptable since it is technically avoidable.
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3. State Responsibility
If the principle is understood as a procedural obligation, it is rela-
tively easy to build a system of responsibility, as the violation of the
procedures will trigger the legal responsibility of the violator. The Reso-
lution on Responsibility and Liability for Environmental Damage
48
attempts to define such a regime and a recent report to the French gov-
ernment 9 follows the same lines at the domestic level.
If the principle comprises an obligation of result, failure to achieve
the specific end would trigger responsibility and in turn, require repara-
tion. Yet, if the irreversible damage has occurred, what kind of sanction
can possibly make sense? The traditional remedy of the restitutio in inte-
grum becomes utterly meaningless. A solution would be to impose
responsibility prior to the damage, when it becomes clear that a party
will not meet its obligations, but it would be very difficult to monitor this
exceptional regime.
B. A Political Guideline
Interpretation of the precautionary principle as a political guideline
prevailed until the mid-1990s, before the doctrine evolved in the direc-
tion of giving a legal value to the concept of precaution. The numerous
treaties and declarations endorsing the principle at the beginning of the
1990s can be seen as the reflection of a certain international consensus
on the ethical meaning of the principle. At the same time, such vague
formulations enabled parties to keep open the substantive interpretation.
As the meaning of the principle became more particular, countries like
the United States became strongly opposed to it. Nollkaemper illustrates
this position by explaining that principles are meant as guidelines rather
than as concrete obligations.0 According to him, the precautionary prin-
ciple gives reasons to act in the way of precaution but does not permit a
specific decision leading to a total protection. Two types of arguments
support the purely political and ethical interpretation of the principle: the
first one is based on nonlegal analysis of the principle by economists,
48. Responsibility and Liability Under International Law for Environmental Damage, In-
stitut du Droit International, Sept. 4, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1473. The text sets out guidelines to
create international regimes of responsibility, focusing on the precautionary principle, com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities, damages and reparation, and the principle of
participation.
49. PHILIPPE KOURILSKY & GENEVItVE VINEY, LE PRINCIPE DE PRECAUTION, RAPPORT
AU PREMIER MINISTRE (1999).
50. Andre Nollkaemper, 'What You Risk Reflects What You Value'and Other Dilemmas
Encountered in the Legal Assault on Risk, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION 80 (David Freestone & Ellen Hey eds.,
1996). Nollkaemper's contribution is all the more striking given that the rest of the book and
its coordinators advocate the recognition of the principle as a legal standard.
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sociologists and other specialists; the second one emphasizes that the
principle is yet too imprecise to be given a legal value.
Adams proposes a cultural interpretation of the principle.5' His
model assumes a liberal laissez-faire environment, where each society
has "risk thermostats" (a tradeoff between the propensity to take risk and
the resulting accidents; the level of risk will correspond to the highest
number of accidents that society can tolerate) which form the basis for a
cost-benefit analysis. Risks represent anticipated benefits, whereas acci-
dents are costs. However, Adams modulates this analysis by introducing
the notion of "cultural filters," which alter the perception of danger with
respect to the accidents and the propensity to take risks. The cultural
filters flaw the strict economic cost-benefit analysis. The precautionary
principle is interpreted as a cultural filter to regulate, for certain societal
groups, their likelihood to take risks. Adams concludes that the principle
does not impose one specific behavior but can be used to justify any risk
regulation. 3 This analysis rules out both the scientific and the legal de-
bates, to the benefit of cultural relativism.
Support for this view can be found in instruments such as the
Agenda 21, which result from a political reflection, are disconnected
from a specific scientific problem, and do not measure the benefits and
costs of a given activity for the environment. They are often used as ex-
amples for advocates of paralegal interpretations of the principle.
Part I described the variations on the formulation of the principle.
Some authors argue that these nuances mean that the notion is not settled
and is thus deprived of any legal meaning. In a number of cases, the
principle is incompletely formulated or not sufficiently specific to im-
pose an obligation upon a State. An additional factor reinforces this
analysis: most agreements endorsing the concept are only soft law.5
Birnie & Boyle and Bodansky took strong positions against accord-
ing any legal value to the principle because of the uncertainties of its
formulation. However, in a later work, Boyle & Freestone turned away
51. John Adams, The Precautionary Principle, 16 ECON. AFFAIRS 6, 6-10 (1995). The au-
thor is a Professor of Geography at University College, London.
52. Id. at 8 (fig. 4), 9.
53. Id. at 10.
54. See, e.g., MANUEL DE PROTECTION DE LA BIODIVERSIT--CONCEPT ET MISE EN CEUV-
RE DES MESURES INCITATIVES, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(O.E.C.D.)(1999). Chapter 111.2 notes that given the uncertainties on the evolution of biologi-
cal diversity, successful policies were based on the precautionary principle and on the notion
of minimal security norm, in order to avoid irreversible damages. The text is not binding and
the content of the precautionary measures referred to are specified nowhere.
55. See David Freestone, International Fisheries Law Since Rio: The Continued Rise of
the Precautionary Principle, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 135, 136 (Alan E. Boyle & David Freestone
eds., 1999) (referring to PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
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from this trend to recognize that it is in the very nature of principles to
remain flexible, both in their content and in their wording, without these
characteristics automatically excluding them from the legal sphere.56
Freestone makes a comparison with U.N. Resolution 1514 (XV) (1960)
on the independence of colonial people, which is not hard law and is yet
considered as a principle of international law.57 He concludes that lack of
precision is not sufficient in itself to rule out the legalism of a concept."
Martin-Bidou tries to determine the legal value of the principle by
examining the place that it takes in the conventions and declarations,
together with the actual formula. She notes that the principle is found in
preambles (Convention on Biological Diversity, Oslo Protocol on At-
mospheric Pollution) or in general obligations (Bamako Convention,
OSPAR Convention, Barcelona Convention on the Protection of the Ma-
rine Environment in the Mediterranean Sea).6° This is insufficient to
indicate the legal characteristics of the principle, but according to the
author, the imprecision of the principle classifies it as a mere guideline.6'
Either the formulation clearly imposes no legal burden or, if the terms
suggest a binding obligation, the vagueness of the substance still gives
rise to no liability.62 Finally, Martin-Bidou observes that environmental
law often develops through framework conventions designed to promote
new norms.63 The inclusion of the principle in such instruments similarly
reveals it as an emerging norm, not an obligation.
This type of analysis is still strong among opponents of the princi-
ple, but the evolution of the doctrine may have given some autonomy to
the concept, as will be shown in the next Part. Moreover, even consider-
ing the principle as a guideline means that States' engagements may be
interpreted in the light of precaution. If conflicting interpretations of an
obligation arise and the convention is in the spirit of the principle, an
interpretation compatible with the logic of precaution should prevail.
THE ENVIRONMENT 98 (1992)); Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precaution-
ary Principle, 33 ENV'T 4 (1991). See also HOHMANN, supra note 45, at 344.
56. Alan E. Boyle & David Freestone, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUS-
TAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES, supra note 55, at
17-18 (discussing the legal status of sustainable development in general). The precautionary
principle is closely articulated with sustainable development. See supra Section I.B.
57. Freestone, supra note 55, at 136.
58. Id. at 135-42, 154-64.
59. Pascale Martin-Bidou, Le principe de pricaution en droit international de
l'environnement 1999 R.G.D.I.P. 631, 659-62.
60. Id. at 660.
61. Id. at 661.
62. Id. at 664.
63. Id. at 661.
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C. A Standard
After a few words on the notion of a standard in international law,
this section will examine how the precautionary principle fits into this
normative category.
Understood in reference to the judiciary, a standard is a framework,
which enables judges to weigh competing interests. 4 Godard proposes
another definition: a standard is a norm that needs to be completed by
nonlegal information to produce legal effects.65 This outside information
can be of a social, economic, or scientific nature.6 For Godard, however,
a standard is not a legal norm. 67 Boy, on the contrary, notes that standards
retain the characteristics of legal norms. A standard is "normatively
closed" (it is conformed to other legal rules) and "cognitively open" (it
calls for references to other systems like morals, economics, science,
etc.).68 It is a reference for judgment that introduces outside information.
Lascoumes follows the same path by concluding that standards are vol-
untarily indeterminate, so that legal and nonlegal information may be
built into the norm.6 9 Lastly, a less doctrinal, although quite broad defini-
tion of international standards is mentioned in Annex 1A to the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and includes "rules, guide-
lines, or characteristics for products or related processes and production
methods '"7
These somewhat obscure definitions are clarified by the example of
the precautionary principle. Part I highlighted certain recurring elements
of the principle: these are the components of the standard. The main fea-
tures are the need for risk evaluation, the requirement of cost-
effectiveness, and continuing scientific research.
64. Gilles Martin, Colloquium, Le principe de precaution ou la transformation des rap-
ports entre science et decision, Paris, Fr. (Apr. 5, 2000).
65. OLIVIER GODARD, LE PRINCIPE DE PRECAUTION DANS LA CONDUITE DES AFFAIRES
HUMAINES (1997). "Norme qui a besoin d'6tre compltde par des informations extdrieures au
droit pour produire des effets juridiques." Id.
66. Id.
67. Olivier Godard, Rdponse 6 Pierre Lascoumes-Rubrique Controverse, 248 ESPRIT
(1998).
68. Laurence Boy, La nature juridique du principe de precaution, 7 NATURE, SCIENCE ET
SOCIdT9 5, 9 (1999).
69. Pierre Lascoumes, La prdcaution, un nouveau standard dejugement, 237 ESPRIT 129,
133 (1997).
70. This definition is targeted more at technical standards than at normative standards
like the precautionary principle. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994,
Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 (1994), at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-ellegal-e/17-tbt.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2002) [hereinafter
TBT Agreement].
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1. Environmental Impact Assessment
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures are a common
feature in modern environmental protection. Together with risk evalua-
tion, EIAs are the basis for a rigorous precautionary policy. Belv~ze
proposes a four-step model of a risk evaluation preceding precautionary
action.7' The first step consists of identifying the dangers.72 This can be
done through the observation of the symptoms, even if the causes remain
unclear. The BSE disease (Mad Cow Disease) exemplifies this approach.
The pathology (symptom) is known but the channels of the contamina-
tion (causation) are still obscure. A second step characterizes the
dangers, qualitatively and quantitatively.73 The propagation of the ad-
verse effects might be difficult to assess, particularly if the cause of the
symptoms is not clearly identified. The third step focuses on the expo-
sure to the pathological agent.74 Combining these three elements results
in the characterization of the risk, which is the last step of the process."
Belvze recommends that the worse case scenario be taken into account,
given the uncertainties of the data.76
This type of analysis coincides with the definitions of a standard dis-
cussed above. The norm imposes a certain conduct (i.e. carrying out a
risk evaluation in a specific way) but does not predetermine the result of
the action.
2. Cost-effectiveness
The risk evaluation was an analysis ex ante, whereas the cost-benefit
analysis is an anticipation of the implementation of a policy. The inclu-
sion of a cost-conscious criterion is a crucial element to build a workable
precautionary standard. The framework Convention on Climate Change
and the Second Ministerial Conference insist that consideration of costs
should be built into the principle. Domestic legislation such as the
French Law 95-101"7 also requires that precautionary action be cost ef-
fective. Underlying this is a desire for proportionality between the costs
induced and the benefits expected. Although this is a necessary and
pragmatic limit to the principle, it is often ambiguously stated. The costs
should be related to the benefits of implementing the policy or to the cost
71. Henri Belv~ze, Lignes directrices pour l'application du principe de prdcaution, 7
NATURE, SCIENCE ET SOClIT9 71,74 (1999).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Law No. 95-101 of Feb. 2, 1995, J.O., Feb. 3, 1995, p. 1840; D.S.L. 1995, 124
(amending the Code Rural [C. Rural] art. 200-1 (Fr.), so-called "Loi Barnier").
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of permanently deteriorating the environment. Both costs and benefits
may have ripple effects for which it is difficult to account. Another prob-
lem is that the cost of a precautionary approach in one domain will be
compared to the benefits that could be yielded by action in another area,
at the same costs.
The economic analysis and the choice of cost-effective solutions
pose infinite problems. Setbon studied a series of alternative scenarios in
relation to the use of HIV-contaminated blood for transfusions."8 Suppos-
ing that the precautionary principle had been applied as early as 1982,
when the contamination risk became known, the solution would have
been to reduce dramatically the number of blood transfusions. Setbon
calculated that the cost of such a measure would have been unacceptable
at the time. After 1983, it was possible to avoid certain high-risk donors
(refuse blood donations originated from prison inmates, in particular) but
the decision to exclude these populations was very controversial. The
author concludes that precaution translates into a redistribution of
"wealth" (considering health or a clean environment as a good) from one
population to another. The cost-benefit analysis should therefore reflect
the net result of this reallocation.
Again, cost evaluation and the obligation to restrict precautionary
policies to cost-effective measures does not indicate what action should
be taken but merely channels behavior in the direction of precaution.
3. Pursuing Research
Scientific uncertainty is at the core of the precautionary principle;
the logical counterpart is that resolution of the scientific gaps will natu-
rally lead to the abandonment of precaution-based policies. To ensure
that the latter are not pretextual, it is therefore necessary to correlate the
implementation of the policy with the continuation of the research. The
WTO Dispute Resolution Body has taken such a stand in the Beef Hor-
mones case,79 whereby the EC is bound to pursue research to justify its
trade restriction or abandon the ban on beef products if science finds the
products innocuous. Another example would be fisheries management: it
is in the best interest of the present and future generations to gain rapid
knowledge of the sustainable level of exploitation of new stocks. Restric-
tive fishing of newly found stocks should therefore go together with a
scientific assessment of the resource.
78. Michel Setbon, "Approche sociologique du principe de precaution," Colloquium, Le
principe de prdcaution ou la transformation des rapports entre science et dicision, Paris, Fr.
(April 5, 2000).
79. See Hormones Panel report, supra note 38; Appellate Body Hormones report, supra
note 38.
Winter 2002]
Michigan Journal of International Law
4. A Baseline for Precaution?
A reasoned application of the precautionary principle also calls for
criteria to trigger the implementation of the principle. Hickey and Walker
focus on the scientific basis justifying the implementation of precaution-
ary action. s The first standard that they advocate is the "reasonable
scientific possibility" that the alleged danger has a tangible ground.8,'
Under this standard, there is not necessarily the need for scientific una-
nimity, as the reasonable scientific possibility may emanate from a
minority of experts, or there may be a disagreement between a main-
stream current and critical alternatives. The authors propose a second,
more stringent test: "reasonable scientific probability."82 In this case, the
scientific community must largely agree that the available data and the
methods used are pertinent and that the conclusion of the analysis is con-
sistent with these methods. It is for the mainstream experts to guarantee
the scientific basis of a precautionary action.
Martin has a more holistic conception of the degree of uncertainty
necessary to trigger precaution.83 His standard, "reasonable doubt,"' in-
cludes both the facts that cast doubt on the legitimacy of a certain
activity or substance, and social factors (national culture as well as pub-
lic reaction to a problem or environmental threat). This approach is in
complete opposition to the standard of the Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), for instance, which requires a scientific
basis for precautionary measures."
5. Reversed Burden of Proof
Closely linked to the previous issue is the question of who has to
bring the scientific justification for implementing precaution. The prin-
ciple is often associated with the reversal of the burden of proof; that is,
instead of putting it on those who seek to regulate an activity to show its
potential dangers, it is on those who want to carry out the activity to
prove it safe. The first group would advance scientific theories support-
ing their claim of harmfulness, whereas the second group would attempt
to show that there is no valid technical ground for regulating their activ-
80. James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the Precautionary Principle in Inter-
national Environmental Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 423, 448-52 (1995).
81. Id. at 449.
82. Id. at 449-50.
83. Martin, supra note 64.
84. "Doute Igitime" in French, the translation is Martin's and may not reflect a strict
equivalence in civil trial procedures with the American standard of "reasonable doubt." Id.
85. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1
(1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
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ity (claiming that there is contradictory evidence might not be enough).
Belv~ze has a very balanced approach, observing that reversing the bur-
den of proof is in itself applying the precautionary principle since it
presupposes a risk, but he also notes that it is still generally left to the
administrative regulators or State policymakers to justify their restric-
tions by proving the dangers of the product.86 Thus, shifting the burden
of proof is not necessarily of the essence of the precautionary principle.
The elements analyzed above show that the precautionary principle
already has a structure corresponding to a legal standard. This gives it
more efficiency as a tool to protect the environment and yet, by nature, it
remains flexible enough to accommodate diverging notions of interven-
tionism.
Construing the precautionary principle as a binding obligation unrav-
els a chain of conceptual problems and material difficulties that suggest
that the principle is not yet ripe for such a status. Nonetheless, the princi-
ple has moved from the academic sphere to the judicial world, where it is
challenged, discussed, and even applied, depending on the jurisdiction.
The next Part compares these various treatments of the principle.
III. THE GROWING RECOGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLE
A study of the attitude of international tribunals toward the precau-
tionary principle is a fundamental test to help determine the legal
implications of the principle. This Part shows that the practice is very
heterogeneous, revealing the emerging nature of the norm.
The principle was brought up in several instances in the ICJ in rela-
tion with environmental litigation, but the court refused to incorporate
the principle in its legal discussion of those cases. The Dispute Settle-
ment Body (DSB) at the WTO deals with the principle in as much as it is
alluded to in the SPS Agreement but the EC has repeatedly tried to in-
voke precaution without reference to the SPS Agreement. The European
Court of Justice (ECJ) exercises its control with respect to article 174 of
the Treaty, which calls for precautionary action in environmental mat-
ters, and the European Commission works to further develop the concept
in conjunction with the ECJ's enforcement action.87 Last, the ITLOS re-
cently took a radical stand by clearly endorsing and prescribing
precautionary action as a legal remedy in a fisheries dispute. These ex-
amples of the disparities of judicial treatment of the principle are
developed below.
86. Belv~ze, supra note 71, at 76.
87. E.C. TREATY art. 174.
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A. The Silence of the ICJ
Two cases came before the ICJ with a party referring to the precau-
tionary principle, but in each occurrence the majority opinions declined
to address the precautionary arguments and instead decided the cases on
other grounds.
Chronologically, the second Nuclear Tests case, between New Zea-
land and France was the first occasion for the court to examine the
principle.88 New Zealand pled that France should prove the absolute in-
nocuity of nuclear tests in the South Pacific (on the Mururoa atoll) or
abstain from carrying out the tests. The court dismissed the claim on
procedural grounds and thus did not have to deal with the substantive
arguments.89 In its memorandum, New Zealand argued that the principle
was widely recognized in international law,' making it an obligation to
evaluate the impact on the environment before undertaking a potentially
dangerous activity and to demonstrate that this activity poses no risk to
the environment. 9' This interpretation advocated a shift in the burden of
proof and called for zero tolerance of risk. France responded that the
legal value of the principle remained most uncertain and that, in any
case, there was no environmental exception with respect to reversing the
burden of proof.92 Although it refused to recognize the principle, the
French memorandum still presented technical arguments tending to
demonstrate the harmlessness of the tests for the environment in the
short and long term. The goal was to take the principle into account at a
policy and diplomatic level, but not at a judicial level. The majority opin-
ion simply did not adjudicate the issue.
Notwithstanding this shortcoming, Judge Weeramantry, in his dis-
senting opinion, insisted that reversing the burden of proof was an
essential element to guarantee an effective protection of the environment
and give full force to the legal obligations tending to ensure this protec-
tion.93 He presented a second argument in favor of shifting the burden of
proof, noting that it is often the party proposing to carry out a potentially
damaging activity who holds the most pertinent information on this ac-
tivity and who is most apt to prove it safe.94 Judge Weeramantry also
sought to rebut the French argument by listing the number of interna-
88. Request for Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the
Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J.
288 (Order of Sept. 22).
89. Id. at 307, Order para. 68.
90. Id. at 298 (referring to the New Zealand submissions).
91. Id. at 298, Order para. 35.
92. Id. at 298, Order para. 38.
93. Id. at 343 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 342.
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tional and regional agreements endorsing the principle and to which
France was a party.9 Particularly, he called attention to a provision of the
OSPAR Convention whereby France and the United Kingdom reserved
for themselves the possibility to immerse low-level radioactive waste if
they could demonstrate that such disposal would not jeopardize the envi-
ronment.96 This provision does implement a reversal of the burden of
proof similar to the procedure advocated by New Zealand in the Nuclear
Tests. The dissenting opinion therefore concluded that the precautionary
principle was already a standard of international law.
The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case 97 between Hungary and Slovakia of-
fers a second example of the reluctance of the ICJ to address the issue of
the precautionary principle. This complex case resulted in a controversial
judgment that many lawyers have deemed incomplete.98 In 1989, Hun-
gary suspended the construction work on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Dam, alleging that the project would result in substantial damage of the
unique ecosystem of the Danube, would diminish the water supply, and
would deteriorate the quality of the water downstream from the dam.
Slovakia replied that these threats to the environment were nonexistent,
and unilaterally proceeded to continue the construction following the
"Variant C" of the 1977 Agreement between the two States. This vari-
ance resulted in the diversion of eighty percent of the Danube waters
(formerly shared by the two neighboring states) to Slovakia. In order to
suppress the legal grounds of operation, Hungary terminated the 1977
Agreement.
Although both parties seemed relatively favorable to the precaution-
ary principle, the court did not use it as a test to determine the case. The
court indicated that "ecological necessity" could excuse a State from
legal responsibility for acts that would otherwise be illegal.99 This "ne-
cessity" is declared if the State can prove the reality and imminence of a
grave danger at the time when the necessity is claimed and that the meas-
ures taken at that point were the only possible response to the threat. This
line of reasoning is fairly distant from the notion of precaution, where the
95. Id. at 343-44.
96. Id. at 343 (referring to OSPAR Convention, supra note 20, Annex II, art. 3, §3(c)).
The said parties could present to the Commission created by the Convention "the results of
scientific studies demonstrating that all potential immersion operations would not create a risk
for human health, would not damage biological resources and marine ecosystems." Id.
97. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Judgment of Sept.
25).
98. See Philippe Sands, International Environmental Litigation and Its Future, 19 U.
RiCH. L. REV. 1619, 1629-33 (1999) (critiquing the majority opinion).
99. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 37-42, paras. 51-54. The court ulti-
mately finds that in the specific instance of Hungary, the necessity was not such as to warrant
a suspension of the State's obligations under the treaty binding Hungary and Slovakia.
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danger is not clearly ascertained. In any case, the analysis remained in
abstracto, since the Court did not characterize the situation as an "eco-
logical necessity." Similarly, the court subscribed to the "recently
developed standards of environmental law" but did not mention EIA,
which seems to be the prerequisite to "ecological necessity" measures.
The parties' positions as to the precautionary principle consisted of an
agreement on the need for a precautionary approach, but Slovakia con-
sidered the conditions for implementation not to be present, contrary to
the Hungarian claim.'°° Hungary further gave an interesting twist to the
argument by linking the precautionary principle to the concept of pre-
vention, less controversial in environmental law. Slovakia would have
violated its obligation to prevent environmental damages by refusing to
examine the potential ecological effects of the project.' °' The court
merely acknowledged that prevention was a fundamental feature of envi-
ronmental protection, due to the often irreversible nature of the
damage. ' Here, the court drew closer to the concept of precaution but
remained vague. In addition, it noted the impracticability of traditional
remedies in the face of irreversible damages. The court was obviously
concerned with the implications of a precautionary obligation in terms of
responsibility.
Here again, Judge Weeramantry, then Vice President of the court, is-
sued a separate opinion, which referred to the Nuclear Tests dissent and
asserted the existence of the sustainable development principle and the
"Continuing Environmental Impact Assessment" obligation. Since, as we
have seen, such concepts may be fully integrated into a precautionary
standard, it is logical to find them developed in this later case. Continu-
ing Environmental Impact Assessment consists of monitoring the effects
of a measure on the environment and also takes into account possible
enhancement in the available scientific data.
These cases testify to the inability of the court to fit the principle in
the traditional categories of international obligations. In direct contradic-
tion with this approach, the ITLOS used precaution both as a legal
argument and as a remedy, as will now be examined.
100. Submissions for Slovakia: M.C. Caffrey, CR 97/9, sec. 4, applicable law §3(c),
http://www.icj-cij.org; Argument for Hungary: P. Sands, CR 97/12 § 12, http://www.icj-cij.org.
101. Submissions for Hungary, §§ 6.64, 6.69.
102. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 78, para. 140 ("The Court is mindful
that, in the field of environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are required on account
of the often irreversible character of damage to the environment and of the limitations inherent
in the very mechanism of reparation of this type of damage.").
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B. The Application by the Law of the Sea Tribunal
In 1999, New Zealand brought an action against Japan alleging that
Japanese fishermen engaged in unilateral experimental fishing of South-
ern Bluefin Tuna (SBT), thus possibly endangering the viability of new
fish stocks. Soon thereafter, Australia filed a complaint on the same
grounds and the cases were treated jointly.' 3 Among other claims, the
plaintiffs alleged that the catches authorized by Japan violated its obliga-
tion to ensure preservation and an optimal exploitation of the fisheries,
and that Japan further violated its precautionary obligations under the
Law of the Sea Convention. '3 Under this Convention, the principle is
treated as a norm binding upon the parties that entails responsibility if it
is violated. The plaintiffs then requested the Tribunal to enjoin Japan
from further illegal fishing and to order Japan to comply with the fishing
quotas defined in a previously existing agreement between the parties.
Additionally, Australia and New Zealand asked that Japan act in a man-
ner consistent with the precautionary principle with respect to new
fisheries. '°5
The Tribunal first proceeded to characterize the situation as one call-
ing for precautionary action, and then, based on a direct implementation
of the principle, it enjoined Japan from further illegal fishing.' °6 The Or-
der noted that under the circumstances, the parties should use precaution
to ensure effective preservation of the resources.0 7 The goal is to prevent
permanent depletion of the SBT stocks. The Tribunal also highlighted
scientific uncertainty regarding the measures to take to maintain the
stocks.' 8 This is the typical setting from which originates the precaution-
ary principle. Accordingly the Tribunal concluded that due to the grave
damage at stake, scientific uncertainty was not a ground for failing to
protect the rights of the parties and to prevent a future depletion of the
109
resource.
The principle is used as a gap-filling measure between the discovery
of resources and their scientific management. Hem views the principle as
an "attempt to buy science a little time" and denotes the acknowledgement
103. Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), Request for Provi-
sional Measures, 117 I.L.R. 148 (Int'l Trib. for the Law of the Sea)[hereinafter Tuna Cases].
104. Id. at 156-57, paras. 28.1.e (N.Z.), 29.1.e (Austl.).
105. Id. at 157-58, paras. 31.3, 32.3 (where plaintiffs request "that the parties act consis-
tently with the precautionary principle in fishing for SBT pending a final settlement of the
dispute").
106. See Moritaka Hayashi, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases: Prescription of Provi-
sional Measures by the International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea, 13 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 361
(2000) (analyzing the case).
107. Tuna Cases, 117 I.L.R. at 163-64, Order para. 77.
108. Id. at 164, Order para. 79.
109. Id., Order para. 80.
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that the understanding of the marine resources has not progressed fast
enough." ° The principle is thus a deviation from the traditional concep-
tual setting of the Law of the Sea embodied in article 61(2) of the
Convention, where conservation and management measures should be
based on the scientific evidence available." However, this departure can
only be implemented on a temporary basis, leaving the 1982 regime un-
disturbed, according to Hern.
The Tuna Cases are groundbreaking in several respects. First, it uses
the precautionary principle as a standard, giving it a normative value.
Second, it implements the principle as a remedy. Finally, the principle is
a particularly adequate tool to preserve the situation and avoid further
deterioration of the resource while awaiting the final decision on the
substantive issues of the case (the current decision is only for provisional
measures). This perspective on the principle shows that it can play a neu-
tral role, contrary to the common criticism that precaution is only an
abstention and prohibition principle.
C. The Debate at the WTO
The SPS Agreement refers to the precautionary principle in article 5,
section 7. 12 This provision is to be read jointly with article 2, section 2,
which provides that members adopting sanitary measures will ensure
that such measures are based on scientific principles and are not main-
tained without sufficient scientific proof. Article 5, section 7 appears as
an exception, available to the Member States on a temporary basis, when
the situation is not fully understood scientifically. This provision incor-
porates various elements of the precautionary standard, like the
acknowledgment of uncertainty and the requirement to pursue research,
if measures are implemented on the basis of precaution. The article does
not specify that the risk should be grave or irreversible, which is consis-
tent with the spirit of the agreement allowing each State to set its own
level of protection, so long as it is justified. Several features of the pre-
110. Sean Hem, Competing Values: Taking a Broad View on the Narrowing Conservation
Regime of the 1982 UNCLOS, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 177, 193-94 (2000).
11l. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 23, art. 61(2).
112. SPS Agreement art. 5, see. 7:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provision-
ally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent
information, including that from the relevant international organizations as well as
from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In such cir-
cumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for
a more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary meas-
ure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.
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cautionary principle are not addressed in article 5, section 7, particularly
the reversal of the burden of proof and the cost-efficiency requirement.
Article 3, section 2 and article 5, section 8 establish a presumption that
State measures are compatible with the SPS Agreement. United States
Shirts and Blouses discussed this standard and concluded that the party
alleging a violation must prove its prima facie case; only then is the bur-
den shifted to the other party to refute the allegations ., There is no
mention of an evidentiary exception for measures adopted under article
5, section 7. Cost restrictions, an important part of the precautionary
standard, are also neglected in the SPS Agreement."' Such omissions
impede a practical application of the principle.
Three major cases raised discussion on the articulation and treatment
of these provisions: Beef Hormones, Japan-Agricultural Products, and
Asbestos. In the Beef Hormones case, the European Communities did not
base their defense on the exceptions of article 5, section 7, but the pre-
cautionary principle was explicitly debated and was invoked by the
Communities as a ground for banning imports of hormone treated beef
products." 5 Conversely, Japan, in Agricultural Products, defended its
policies under article 5, section 7, but the principle is nowhere men-
tioned in the reports.1 6 Finally, in Asbestos, the Appellate Body relied
upon the precautionary principle as a standard in its analysis."
7
1. The Beef Hormones Case
The relevant aspects of the Beef Hormones case focus on risk evalua-
tion and management. Under article 5, sections 1-2, the European
Communities had to bring scientific proof of the harmfulness of the
products to justify restrictive trade measures. The United States and
Canada deemed that Europe had not gathered sufficient proof and there-
fore was in violation of its WTO obligations. The Panel agreed with the
plaintiffs. The European Communities based their appeal on the claim
113. United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses
from India, WT/DS33/AB/R (May 23, 1997), n. 18, http://www.wto.org.
114. Steve Chamovitz, The Supervision of Health and Biosafety Regulations by World
Trade Rules, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 271, 294 (2000).
115. Hormones Panel report, supra note 38; Appellate Body Hormones report, supra
note 38.
116. Panel Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DC76/R (Oct.
27, 1998), http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Agricultural Products Panel report]; Report of the
Appellate Body, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DC76/AB/R (Feb. 22,
1999), http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Appellate Body Agricultural Products report].
117. Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, WT/DC I 35/R (Sept. 18, 2000), http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Asbes-
tos Products Panel report]; Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DCI35/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001),
http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Appellate Body Asbestos Products report].
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that the precautionary principle had not been fully taken into account in
the interpretation of the SPS Agreement and that the Panel had not given
a fair assessment of the scientific data gathered by the EC. The EC also
offered to implement a continuing research program in accordance with
the standard of precaution as discussed above. The Appellate Body re-
futed the first two arguments but did recognize that the principle was not
exhausted by article 5, section 7. This statement was immediately quali-
fied with the note that the principle did not, however, trump the treaty
but may be used for interpretation where appropriate. Furthermore, the
Appellate Body reaffirmed the right for a Member State to choose pro-
tection levels higher than the international standards" and that the treaty
did not prescribe a specific level of acceptable risk. The report suggested
that even a scientific minority opinion could justify higher levels of sani-
tary protection. ' 9
As noted above, the EC's measures were not based on article 5, sec-
tion 7, since they were not meant to be temporary measures. Rather, the
EC argued that the precautionary principle was a general principle of
international law and cited to the book by Freestone and Hey for doc-
trinal reference.'" Canada refuted this argument, 2' and referred to Birnie
and Boyle.'2
Annex A, section 4 of the SPS Agreement specifies the proper risk
evaluation procedure. It involves a qualitative and quantitative study of
the risk and of its probability of occurrence. The Appellate Body Hor-
mones report endorses this approach'23 and also refers to the report
issued by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World
Health Organization (WHO) on the application of risk analysis in the
domain of food regulation.' 24 This document recommends a four-step
procedure: (1) identification of the dangers; (2) characterization of the
dangers; (3) evaluation of the exposure; and (4) characterization of the
risks. Finally, article 5, section 2 lists the technical information to take
into account in the evaluation.'25 The EC claims that in order to achieve
118. Appellate Body Hormones report, supra note 38, paras. 172-177.
119. Id. paras. 182-194.
120. For particular relevance, see James Cameron & Julie Abouchar, The Status of the
Precautionary Principle in International Law, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 50, at 29.
121. Hormones Panel report, supra note 38, sec. IV.2.i.vii, The Precautionary Principle.
122. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 55.
123. See Appellate Body Hormones report, supra note 38, § 8.101.
124. APPLICATION OF RISK ANALYSIS TO FOOD STANDARDS ISSUES, REPORT OF THE
JOINT FAO/WHO EXPERT CONSULTATION, 1995.
125. The list includes available scientific proofs, pertinent production methods and pro-
cedures, the existence or absence of specific diseases and parasites, ecological and
environmental conditions. SPS Agreement art 5, sec. 2.
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the zero-risk goal that it has, and to ensure that these products are com-
pletely free from any hormones residue, it will not tolerate any use of
hormones in meat products regardless of whether the animals were
treated in a manner conforming with good agricultural practices. The
Appellate Body's analysis finds an inconsistency between the EC's
measures and compliance with the risk evaluation results.'26 If a hormone
treatment procedure has been approved and recognized as a good prac-
tice, a ban on the derived products cannot be considered based on a risk
evaluation as set out by the SPS Agreement and the Codex. The precau-
tionary principle cannot trump the conclusion of a risk evaluation
procedure, except as provided under article 5, section 7.
This case opens the way for a wider recognition of the principle and
crystallizes the international debate on the principle. The EC wants the
precautionary principle to be fully integrated into the agreement, while
other States view article 5, section 7 as a loophole for taking illegal pro-
tectionist measures. 7 However, if the Appellate Body declined to
confine the principle to its expression in article 5, section 7, it did not
fully develop the consequences of its role as an interpretative principle.
2. The Japan-Agricultural Products Case
In an attempt to prevent a fruit parasite from being imported along
with certain fruit varieties (apples, cherries, peaches, apricots, plums,
pears, and walnuts), Japan banned imports of these products from the
United States. A replacement phytosanitary treatment, if applied to the
fruits, enabled the attainment of the domestic level of protection and thus
opened the Japanese market to American fruits. However, in 1987, the
Ministry of Agriculture developed a confirmation procedure to test the
imported products and to ensure that the replacement treatment was fully
efficient. The disputed provision consisted of the obligation, in this new
procedure, to test each variety of fruit, which the United States claimed
was not justified. Japan defended on the ground that it had brought suffi-
cient proof of the scientific need for this procedure, and in the
alternative, that the measure could be maintained under article 5, sec-
tion 7. This strategy may well be derived from the lessons of the Beef
Hormones case, where the EC had not backed up its claim with a refer-
ence to the exception of article 5.
The Appellate Body, confirming the Panel below, concluded that the
per-variety testing measure was not supported by scientific proof and
that even if the measures were temporary under article 5, section 7, Ja-
pan had not complied with the requirements of the second sentence of
126. Appellate Body Hormones report, supra note 38, § 8.161.
127. Charnovitz, supra note 114, at 292.
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the provision.'28 The latter requires that the state implementing the excep-
tion seek additional information and reexamines the phytosanitary
measure "in a reasonable delay" (apparently, the eleven year interval
between the creation of the Japanese program and the WTO claim ex-
ceeded the notion of reasonable delay for reconsidering a temporary
measure).' 29 The Appellate Body interpreted article 5, section 7 as four
cumulative obligations.'3° The exceptional measure may be taken (1) in
relation with a situation where available scientific information is insuffi-
cient, (2) and in any case, the measure must be based on the available
information. The exception may be maintained (3) if the State strives to
gather additional data to make a more accurate risk assessment, (4) and
in any case, the measure must be reexamined within a reasonable delay.
By contrast, Japan interpreted article 5, section 7 only in the light of arti-
cle 2, section 2 of the SPS Agreement (requiring that measures be taken
on the basis of scientific proof, with the exception of article 5, section 7).
In this perspective, the only legally relevant portion of article 5, section 7
is the first sentence, emphasizing scientific uncertainty.
Another important discussion focuses on the interpretation of "suffi-
cient scientific proof." Both article 2, section 2 and article 5, section 7
use the expression and Japan contended that it had the same meaning in
both instances, but the United States claimed that the expression referred
to different contents in each provision. Under the American interpreta-
tion, the scientific proofs in article 5, section 7 are insufficient if they do
not permit the undertaking of a satisfactory risk evaluation. The Appel-
late Body endorses this opinion but does not take a position on whether
this is different from the meaning of "sufficient scientific proof' in arti-
cle 2, section 2.'"' Surprisingly, this interpretation is consistent with the
European Commission's analysis of the precautionary principle: the
European position is that the principle is part of risk management (the
political decisionmaking process) when uncertainty precludes a fully
informed risk assessment and there is a major risk.'
This decision does contribute to particularizing the content and the
application of the precautionary approach as formulated in article 5, sec-
tion 7. Japan-Agricultural Products also tries to define the meaning of
scientific uncertainty but fails to articulate it with other provisions of the
WTO law. Finally, it does not solve the problems raised by the Beef
128. Appellate Body Agricultural Products report, supra note 116, paras. 86-88.
129. Id. para. 143(b).
130. Id. para. 89.
131. Id. paras. 72-74.
132. Communication on the Precautionary Principle, COM (2000)1 final at 13-14
[hereinafter Communication].
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Hormones case and rather appears to restrict precaution to the exception
of article 5, section 7.
3. The Asbestos Case
Recently, France has implemented a significant anti-asbestos pro-
gram, both removing asbestos from existing structures and prohibiting
the use of this notorious carcinogen in future constructions. It also
banned domestic production and foreign imports of this substance as part
of the program. The material, known for decades to have deadly conse-
quences on human health, is to be replaced by substitute products, which
are safer. Canada provided about two thirds of one of the asbestos prod-
ucts, the chrysotile fiber. Canada challenged the French ban on the
grounds that it violated article 111.4 of the GATT (national treatment), "3
claiming that the chrysotile fibers and the domestically used asbestos-
free substitutes were "like products". Canada also claimed that the fiber,
used in high-density cements, posed no identifiable risk to human health,
a statement that the EC challenged. The existence of a risk was in dis-
pute and the subsequent issue was to determine, if the French measure
was justified under article XX(b) of the GATT (public health protec-
tion),3 4 whether an alternative less restrictive to trade was available to
achieve the same level of protection. As in the Beef Hormones case, the
EC did not rely on article 5, section 7, nor did it invoke the precautionary
principle, since the ban is permanent and the risk scientifically ascer-
tained.'35 However, it can be argued that the Appellate Body used
precaution as a standard in its analysis.
On the face of the Panel's report, the precautionary principle has no
place in the article XX(b) interpretation.' 3 First, article XX(b) can be in-
voked only when there is a verified risk to human or animal health. The
principle is therefore incompatible with measures based on this article.
Second, the report, relying on numerous international organizations'
documents, determined that there was sufficient evidence of the risk to
human health posed by the fibers. In other words, this is not a context of
scientific uncertainty as to the nature and extent of the risk. For these rea-
sons, the Panel found that the French measures, discriminatory under
article 111.4 of the GATT (the Panel had rejected the distinction of products
133. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. III.4, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
134. GATT art. XX(b).
135. The Asbestos case did not rely on the SPS Agreement but was argued under TBT
and GATT. See TBT Agreement; GATT.
136. Hans-Joachim Priess & Christian Pitschas, Protection of Public Health and the
Role of the Precautionary Principle in WTO Law: A Trojan Horse Before Geneva's Walls?, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 519, 539 (2000).
Winter 2002]
Michigan Journal of International Law
based on their harmfulness to human health), were justified under article
XX(b) of the GATT.'37
The Appellate Body's report reversed the Panel on the finding that
the chrysotile and the substitutes were like products.'38 It found that not
only should the diverse impact on human health be taken into considera-
tion to differentiate the products, but the consumer perception and
behavior, with respect to the substance, was also an indication that they
were not equivalent.'39 This makes the article XX(b) analysis unneces-
sary, but the Appellate Body nevertheless reviewed this provision as
well.
The TBT Agreement addresses specifically de facto discrimination
claims of the type at bar. Its article 2.2 sets the obligation not to adopt
technical regulations for the purpose of creating unnecessary obstacles to
trade. However, this obligation is limited: "technical regulations shall not
be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective,
taking into account of the risks non-fulfillment would create .... In as-
sessing such risks relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia:
available scientific and technical information, related processing tech-
nology or intended end-use products."'4° This approach differs from the
strict requirements of article XX(b) of the GATT and it opens the way to
a precautionary analysis. Because states have to take into account the
risks at stake when searching for alternative regulations, they may limit
their search and implement measures that might not be trade-optimal but
that are proof with respect to the regulatory objective. Following the
same logic, the Appellate Body, in the Beef Hormones case, stated that
"responsible, representative governments commonly act from perspec-
tives of prudence and precaution where risks of irreversible, e.g. life-
terminating, damage to human health are concerned."'4 ' In the Asbestos
case, the risk is indeed life-terminating4 and the need for speedy action
may justify the implementation of a trade-restrictive measure without the
137. Asbestos Products Panel report, supra note 117, paras. 8.193-194.
138. Appellate Body Asbestos Products report, supra note 117, para. 131.
139. Id. paras. 127-130. The Appellate Body had already indicated that a series of fac-
tors could be taken into account to determine whether products are "like." Report of the
Appellate Body, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996),
http://www.wto.org. See also Robert Howse & Petros C. Mavroidis, Europe's Evolving Regu-
latory Strategy for GMOs-The Issue of Consistency With WTO Law: Of Kine and Brine, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 317, 319 n.7 (2000).
140. TBT Agreement art. 2.2. (emphasis added).
141. Appellate Body Hormones report, supra note 38, § 124.
142. The Appellate Body report in the Asbestos case notes that the interest for regulation
"is both vital and important to the highest degree." Appellate Body Asbestos Products report,
supra note 117, para. 172.
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delays entailed by looking for speculative alternatives.' 43 This analysis
defeats the Canadian claim that France should have further examined
less restrictive measures. The underlying rational is precaution: the risk
is irreversible and scientific basis points to a substantial risk; waiting to
take action is therefore inappropriate.'"
Article XX(b) does not refer to "available information," as opposed
to the TBT Agreement provision. The Appellate Body rejected the Cana-
dian interpretation of article XX and thus recognized that in the case at
stake, states could act on the basis of available and incomplete informa-
tion to eliminate the higher risks.' 45 Here, the Appellate Body alludes to
the uncertainty surrounding the substitute products that may not be much
safer than the asbestos products. The difference is that the risks triggered
by using asbestos products are sufficiently evidenced, whereas the risks
created by the substitutes are not precisely known.
Although these three cases are consistent in their interpretation of
precaution, they point to an extension of the precautionary principle,
outside of article 5, section 7 of the SPS Agreement, without clearly de-
lineating the new role assigned to it. The Beef Hormones case presented
the principle as possibly an interpretative one and the Asbestos case fits
in this new trend. The issue is now whether WTO law should further
formalize the interpretative function of the principle and, if so, control its
domain of application. The Asbestos case already shows that use of the
principle is not limited to provisions related to scientific uncertainty.
Perhaps it is the recognition that available information is always limited
and that regulatory decisions are taken to the best of our knowledge, not
in the perfect information context, which serves as an assumption in nu-
merous economic models. Given the many remaining issues about the
definition of the principle, it seems utopian to contemplate the formula-
tion of a full-fledged principle in WTO law. Precaution cannot yet
translate into a bright line rule. On the other hand, if it is accepted as a
judgment guide, it could find a place as an analytic principle that Panels
and the Appellate Body would use to adjudicate cases. The precautionary
principle, as an interpretative tool, would be understood as a standard of
reasonableness in the face of grave risks and uncertainty.
143. Robert Howse & Elisabeth Tuerk, The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations-A
Case Study of the Canada-EC Asbestos Dispute, in THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS, ARTICLE 111-NATIONAL TREATMENT (Grainne De Burca & Jo-
anna Scott eds., forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 315, on file with author).
144. Appellate Body Asbestos Products report, supra note 117, paras. 155-167 (showing
that health is a compelling objective in the article XX(b) analysis).
145. Appellate Body Asbestos Products report, supra note 117, para. 168.
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D. The Endorsement by the European Communities
European Community law has evolved steadily towards the recogni-
tion of the precautionary principle'46 at the same time as the latter has
diffused in the domestic laws of Member States. The ECJ pioneered this
trend by referring to the principle, implicitly at first and later more ex-
plicitly. As a result, the European Commission published a
Communication on the Precautionary Principle in 2000 to formalize and
integrate the position of the Communities on the issue. The first section
presents the judicial evolution and the second section focuses on the
Commission's action and the secondary law.
1. The ECJ Jurisprudence: Toward a Precautionary Analysis
A first case, on the prohibition of drift-nets,'47 involved tuna fisher-
men who were put at a disadvantage by the prohibition of this fishing
technique in the North Atlantic Ocean. 48 Use of drift-nets longer than 2.5
kilometers was thought to lead to overexploitation of albacore. The
plaintiffs claimed that the Commission had no scientific basis for im-
plementing the regulation, since the particular variety of tuna at stake
was not classified as endangered. The Attorney General opposed the pre-
cautionary principle as a defense, claiming that the measure was
necessary to prevent a depletion of the tuna stocks. The court maintained
the regulation without explicitly referring to precaution but stated that
conservation measures need not be in full conformity with scientific
opinions and that the absence or inconclusiveness of such opinions
should not prevent the Council from adopting necessary measures.141
146. E.C. TREATY art. 174, § 2. This section of the E.C. Treaty is the basis for much of
the European environmental law regulation:
Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking
into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Community. It
shall be based on the precautionary principle and on principles that preventive ac-
tion should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at
source and that the polluter should pay.
Id.
147. Council Regulation 1239/98, 1998 O.J. (L 171) 1.
148. Case C-405/92, Armand Mondiet SA v. Armement Islais SARL, 1993 E.C.R. I-
6133. This case was followed by a second case, Case T-138/98, ACAV v. Council, 2000
E.C.R. 11-341, which maintained the challenged regulation.
149. Armand Mondiet SA, 1993 E.C.R. at 1-6134.
It follows from the wording of Article 2 of Regulation No. 170/83 establishing a
Community system for the conservation and management of fishery resources that
the measures for the conservation of fishery resources need not be completely con-
sistent with the scientific advice and the absence of such advice or the fact that it is
inconclusive cannot prevent the Council from adopting such measures as deems
necessary for achieving the objectives of the common fisheries policy.
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Even though the court did not label this analysis as precautionary, the
allusion to the principle is quite transparent.
The court went one step further in the BSE disease case.' 50 The court
rejected the request for provisional measures despite the scientific uncer-
tainty surrounding the Creutzfeld-Jakob disease (i.e. the human version
of the BSE disease). The lack of scientific certainty was not a sufficent
basis for lifting the ban on British beef. The court further recognized that
the most probable explanation for the contamination to human beings is
exposure to BSE, which justifies the continuation of the ban, regardless
of the economic consequences for the plaintiffs. The court stated that
scientific uncertainties were not a reason to postpone action."' Finally,
the court noted that the Commission's regulation is "transitory," called
for continuing scientific research, and issued an invitation to take new
information into account in future decisions.5 2 These elements partici-
pate in the precautionary standard, and the analysis sets a binding
precedent. In fact, it has already been referred to by the Court of First
Instance in Bergaderm, which prohibited the use of certain chemicals in
sunscreen cosmetics.
5 3
The ECJ derived the precautionary principle from article 174 of the
E.C. Treaty, but also applied it as an interpretation of the Commission's
regulations. A parallel could be made with the WTO, where the principle
is endorsed specifically in one provision (article 5, section 7 of the SPS
Agreement) but also used for interpretation of other provisions or situa-
tions. However, the ECJ took a more pro-active stand than the DSB.
2. The Formalization by the Commission
The principle has been progressively incorporated into the decision-
making process, and is fully discussed in the recent Communication.
In 1997, the Commission published a Green Book on the General
Principles of Food Legislation in the European Union, which alludes to
the precautionary principle and, more generally, insists on the need for
scientific consultation in the elaboration of regulations to achieve better
150. After the embargo against British beef was implemented, a series of cases chal-
lenged this ban. First, came a request for provisional measures to lift the ban. Case C-180/96,
U.K. v. Comm'n, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3903. This was followed by the substantive analysis. Case C-
157/96, The Queen v. Ministry of Agric., Fisheries & Food, 1998 E.C.R. 1-2211.
151. The Queen v. Ministry of Agric., Fisheries & Food, 1998 E.C.R. at 2298 ("Where
there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to human health, the institutions may
take protective measures without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks
become fully apparent.").
152. Id. at 2298.
153. Case T-199/96, Labs. Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm S.A. & J.J. Goupil v. Comm'n,
1998 E.C.R. 11-2805.
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risk management.14 Similarly, the Communication on Consumers'
Health and Food Safety states that the Commission should consider the
principle when analyzing risks in the face of uncertainty.'5 The Commu-
nication on the Precautionary Principle (the Communication) followed a
speech by Romano Prodi at the European Parliament and a Resolution
taken by the Council.5 6 It also came as an official statement in the after-
math of the Cartagena Protocol.
The Communication aims at guaranteeing that the precautionary
principle will not be used to justify arbitrary decisions but is actually
implemented in circumstances where a risk has been evidenced but is not
fully qualified. For the sake of legal predictability, it is essential to spec-
ify how and when the principle intervenes. Following a traditional
analysis of the principle, the Communication establishes two conditions
to the implementation of precaution: (1) the identification of a potential
damage; and (2) the insufficiency of information on this risk.57 In the
risk evaluation, special attention should be given to scientific dissidence
and minority opinions, so long as they offer appropriate credentials. At
the same time, the Communication recommends identifying and circum-
scribing the uncertainties themselves.'5 8 Contrary to the Anglo-Saxon
approach, the Commission rejects the notion of a "no need for interven-
tion" level and reserves the option to define whatever level of risk is
socially acceptable. If the precautionary principle is articulated with a
scientific analysis, it remains within the realm of the political power to
judge whether society calls for precaution or not.
So far, the Communication does not appear groundbreaking. How-
ever, it presents creative options for the implementation of the
precautionary measures themselves. The Commission obviously wants to
preserve a wide panel of actions, ranging from funding a research pro-
gram, simply informing the public on the potential toxicity of a product
(the labeling of GMO products is an example), to banning a product (e.g.
the British beef case) or a substance. Moreover, the Communication af-
154. Green Book on the General Principles of Food Legislation in the European Union,
COM (97)176 final at part 4, ch. II ("In order to achieve a high level of protection and in cases
where scientific uncertainty precludes a full risk evaluation, it is necessary to proceed with
prudence with respect to risk management and to apply the precautionary principle.").
155. Communication on Consumers' Health and Food Safety, COM (97)183 final at 20.
156. Communication, supra note 132.
157. Id. at 14.
158. The Communication specifies that certain elements should be taken into account
when evaluating the risk and available data. These include animals, models, and reactions to
extrapolate the effect of a product on human health; weight charts to make comparison be-
tween species, considering substantial security margins when assessing admissible daily dose
of a product; and adoption of the "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA) standard for
toxic contaminant. The text also rejects the admissible daily dose analysis for substances that
are known genotoxics and carcinogens.
[Vol. 23:429
Winter 2002] The Precautionary Principle 467
firms that a conscious decision not to take action may also be within the
realm of precaution.
Last, the Communication integrates a number of principles into the
precautionary approach. Some are long-standing fundamentals of EC
law, such as proportionality and nondiscrimination, but others are more
specific to the topic, such as cost-benefit analysis, continuing scientific
research, and coherence of the measures.'59 The measures must be pro-
portional to the level of protection chosen, with a special attention paid
to the economic implications of the action.'" Cost-benefit study is a con-
stant of precautionary analysis, as well as monitoring the measures
implemented and following up on research. As to reversing the burden of
proof, the Commission expressed strong reservations with respect to a
systematic reversal. 16 Some regulations already provide for a reversal,
for substances considered a priori risky or dangerous, but the Communi-
cation does not recommend a generalization of the procedure.
3. Secondary Law
Notwithstanding the attempt of the Commission to formulate a ho-
mogeneous European policy on the precautionary principle, recent
debates regarding GMO regulations have shown that the consensus is
less than perfect. The current revision of 1990 Directives on the confined
use and voluntary dissemination of GMOs 62 created an opposition be-
tween the European Parliament, which wanted to give the principle an
essential role in the new procedure, and the Commission, which only
endorsed the principle at a general level. In the final compromise, the prin-
ciple was included in the preamble and meant to irrigate the whole text.
Domestic legislation taking measures in application of the Communities'
regulations provide leeway for the treatment of the precautionary princi-
ple. In fact, this articulation of European and domestic legislation on this
topic gave rise to a growing number of litigation procedures.' 63 For ex-
ample, France recorded genetically modified corn as a variety legally
grown in the country. Greenpeace filed a complaint in the highest adminis-
trative court to protest against this measure and obtained a stay order. The
159. Communication, supra note 132, at 17-20.
160. The Commission still has hesitations with respect to the "zero-risk" goal. It seemed
to require such a stringent level of protection in the Beef Hormones case, but the Communica-
tion acknowledges that zero tolerance to risk can rarely be achieved.
161. Communication, supra note 132, at 20-21.
162. Council Directive 90/219, 1990 O.J. (L117) 1. Council Directive 90/220, 1990 O.J.
(L 117) 15.
163. Patrick Thieffry, Le contentieux naissant des organismes gingtiquement modifies, I
REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPIEN 81, 85-93 (Jan.-Mar. 1999) (discussing the legal
effect of EU regulations and cases involving precautionary obligations on discrepant French
regulations).
Michigan Journal of International Law
judgment was founded on a precautionary analysis emphasizing the
potentially adverse effects of cultivating this genetically engineered corn.
However, the allusion to the principle disappeared in the substantivejudgment."6
The European Communities are probably the most active political
and judicial bodies with respect to the precautionary principle, together
with the ITLOS. The Appellate Body of the WTO has been more recep-
tive to precautionary arguments, especially in the recent Asbestos case,
but an overt codification of precaution outside the scope of article 5, sec-
tion 7 of the SPS Agreement is not yet contemplated. The European
Communities maneuver to export their conception of the principle in the
WTO, both through the cases discussed above, to which the EC was a
party, and through policy submissions to the General Council of the or-
ganization.
CONCLUSION
Although it is still evolving, the precautionary principle appears as a
standard of international law at the doctrinal level as well as in practice.
It is interesting to note a convergence between American and European
academia regarding the legal status of the principle. On both sides of the
Atlantic, a consensus is developing around the notion of the standard but
dissent remains on either end of the spectrum, considering the principle
as a guideline or claiming its binding force.
In the international law practice and at the political level, the
conception of the principle tends to diverge. The European Communities
work to export their notion of the principle, at the same time that they
strengthen its application on a domestic level. This strategy is not always
successful, particularly at the WTO.
More generally, the principle introduces a radical shift in the rela-
tionship between science and policymaking. It opens many possibilities
for the regulators, hence the need for a precise framework of application.
Key elements of such a regime would be following objective risk as-
sessment procedures, defining a socially acceptable level of risk,
continuing scientific research, and reexamining the precautionary meas-
ures as information becomes available. The issue of the burden of proof
remains perhaps the most controversial aspect of the precautionary prin-
ciple as reversing the burden of proof is often considered the foremost
expression of the principle.
164. Association Greenpeace France, 25 Sept. 1998, Gaz. Pal. [1999], 22-23, pan.
jurispr. 27.
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The analysis of WTO and ECJ cases has shown that the WTO and
the European Communities have different capacities to develop a precau-
tionary approach. The ECJ took the lead in incorporating precaution in
its reasoning, even though the statutory basis (the E.C. Treaty) was not
very specific. In contrast, the DSB still struggles to apply article 5, sec-
tion 7 of the SPS Agreement and hesitates to extend precaution outside
of this provision. The ECJ can blend environmental and trade issues
without being limited by article 174 of the E.C. Treaty or even having to
refer explicitly to the treaty. Environment or sanitary issues fall within
the jurisdiction of the WTO adjudication body only in as much as they
are side issues of a trade dispute, whereas the ECJ has full jurisdiction
on environment claims. This may be an explanation for the leeway that
the court has to develop precautionary analysis. Because the precaution-
ary principle is considered an environmental question, the WTO body
has to justify its legal analysis with article XX(g) of the GATT or other
environmental or sanitary exceptions. These narrow bases prove more
and more inadequate to treat complex questions where environment or
public health concerns and trade are intricately linked. Incorporating
environmental rules more fully into general trade regulations might open
new possibilities for the DSB.
Finally, this Note presented precaution as an example of an emerging
category of international norms: the standards. It also argued that the
legal status of the principle was evolving from a policy discourse to a
binding form. It is important to note that the status of the principle as a
standard is not necessarily a step on the way to the creation of a rule.
The fact that a treaty makes it a rule to use precaution does not alter the
nature of precaution as a standard. The reference to reasonableness in
domestic law, for example, derives its force from being a standard of
judgment and cannot become a hard line rule. International standards
operate in a similar way. The precautionary principle will therefore gain
its legal value from being refined by negotiators and interpreted by adju-
dicators rather than being turned into a traditional rule.
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